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Introduction 
World War II had come to an end with disastrous economic and political consequences. Europe 
had suffered in particular: agricultural and industrial production had significantly fallen below 
pre-war levels, and so had exports; there were food shortages, deficient housing and scarcity of 
raw materials; existing capital equipment was either devastated, or obsolete and ill-adapted to 
peace production; people were hungry, poor, and demoralized; gold and dollar reserves had 
been depleted and access of European economies to world markets was lacking. At the politi-
cal level there was humiliation and shame on one side, Germany, aching nationalism and politi-
cal divisiveness on the other. Political antagonism between west and east would cleave the 
world into two hostile blocs for more than a generation. Civil and political liberties and de-
mocratic institutions were fragile and under assault from misery, lack of opportunities, and 
widespread pessimism. At that time, a soldier—a former chief of staff of the United States 
Army who had become secretary of state—George Catlett Marshall, rose to address young stu-
dents of Harvard University with a truly visionary message: 
”It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in 
the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no 
political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any 
country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose 
should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emer-
gence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.” 
(George C. Marshall, Harvard University commencement ceremonies of June 5, 
1947.) 
Marshall’s sketch of ideas would form the bedrock of an American foreign policy initiative and 
foreign aid program that was truly unique in its approach and amazingly successful. Discarding 
the punitive philosophy of the Treaty of Versailles, Marshall stood for international cooperation 
and ‘creative peace’—as one observer has called it1—and this was initiated against political 
opposition at home where the polls showed little support for the Plan and where there were 
strong isolationist tendencies in Congress. The program was criticized to be a waste of money 
with little economic and political impact in Europe. It was neither expected to induce much 
economic restructuring and development under the conditions prevailing in Europe—where 
government interference and planning was rampant—nor deter those who favored communism 
from flirting with Moscow. On the contrary, concern was expressed that the plan would shelter 
uneconomic and unsustainable industrial structures of European economies, that it would up-
hold anti-market interventionist governments, and that it would run counter U.S. and European 
private business interests. Finally there was opposition to the Plan on the grounds that it would 
assist Europe’s colonial powers in maintaining their grip on African and Asian territories. 
                                                 
1  Porter letter to Kindleberger, January 16, 1947, RG 59, file: 501.BD Europe/1-1647, 
quoted in Hogan (1987, p.37). 
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True, Marshall did not stand-alone with his initiative at the time. The cooperative and multilat-
eral spirit of his program had equally guided the conception of important institutional arrange-
ments at the international level, notably the conception of the Bretton-Woods institutions—the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and GATT—, but these institutions would unfold 
only later, and the Plan was thus crucial for political and economic developments in Europe. 
For the world economy, the initiative was indeed bold and unprecedented.  
Marshall’s original speech contains little details and specifications of the Plan, but it was to 
spawn the singular European Recovery Program (ERP) that was formally presented by presi-
dent Harry Truman in a message to Congress only six months later. This Program was to endure 
for four years and designed to achieve three ambitious policy objectives: the expansion of 
European agricultural and industrial production; the restoration of sound currencies, budgets, 
and finances of individual European countries; and the stimulation of international trade among 
European countries and between Europe and the rest of the world.  
”Creative Peace” Then 
The amounts expended under the Plan range between $10 and $13 billion, or roughly $70 to 
$90 billion in today’s prices (Table 1).2 Two implementing agencies were set up, one on the 
American side (the Economic Cooperation Administration, ECA), one in Europe (the Organiza-
tion for European Economic Cooperation, OEEC, in Paris, which was to become the nucleus 
for today’s Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD). This division of 
competencies reflected Marshall’s intent to establish a truly transatlantic partnership, a ”joint 
venture” between the United States and participating European countries, and a multilateral and 
shared responsibility for carrying the Program to success. 
And success it was, indeed! By the end of 1951, during the four years of the plan, industrial 
production for all participating countries had increased by two thirds and agricultural produc-
tion by one quarter. Aggregated GDP had grown by 25 per cent during that same period. The 
trade deficit of participating European states with regard to the dollar area had fallen from 
about $8 billion in 1947 to nil during the first half of 1953,3 and this despite deteriorating terms 
of trade.  
Success can also be expressed in terms of specific quantitative objectives like steel production 
(60 million tons/year compared to a target of 55 million tons/year which had already been set at 
an ambitious 20 per cent above pre-war production) or oil-refining capacity (twice as high as 
the official target). Financial stability in Europe had been restored (also by other measures, of 
course, such as the German currency reform of 1948) and the ”dollar gap” had been virtually 
closed. Intra-regional trade among OEEC-countries had substantially grown as it was fostered 
under the Plan, institutionally supported by a European Payments Union (EPU) established in 
1950 that acted as a clearing and settlement system for payments among member states. During 
the duration of the Plan, government budgets recovered through stable wages, higher taxes, and 
the consolidation of debt burdens, and budget deficits could be reduced substantially. 
 
                                                 
2  U.S. Agency for International Development, November 16, 1971. 
3  OECD Observer, June 1967, pp. 10-11. 
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Table 1: Funds Made Available to ECA for European Economic Recovery (a) 
(Millions of dollars) 
Funds Available April 3, 1948,  
to June 30, 
1949 
July 1,1949,  
to June 30, 
1950 
July 1,1950,  
to June 30, 
1951 
Total 
Direct appropriations (b) 5,074.0  3,628.4 2,200.0 10,902.4 
Borrowing authority (loans) (c)  972.3  150.0  62.5  1,184.8 
Borrowing authority  
(investment guaranty program) (d)  
150.0 50.0  --  200.0 
Funds carried over from interim aid  14.5  6.7  --  21.2 
Transfers from other agencies (e) 9.8 225.1 217.0 451.9 
Funds made available (gross) 6,220.6  4,060.2 2,479.5  12,760.3 
Less transfers to other agencies (f)  --  -- 225.4  225.4 
Funds made available (net)  6,220.6  4,060.2 2,254.1  12,534.9 
a. Compiled from figures made available by the budget division of ECA and from figures published in the 
Thirteenth Report of ECA, pp. 39 and 152; and Thirteenth Semiannual Report of the Export-Import Bank of 
Washington, D.C. For the Period July-December 1951. Appendix I, pp. 65-66.  
b. The Foreign Aid Appropriation Act of 1949 appropriated $4 billion for 15 months, but authorized expendi-
ture within 12 months. The Foreign Aid Appropriation Act of 1960 contained a supplemental appropriation 
of $ 1,074 million for the quarter April 2 to June 30, 1949, and an appropriation of $3,628.4 million for 
fiscal 1950. The General Appropriation Act of 1951appropriated $2,250 million for the European Recov-
ery Program for the fiscal year 1951, but the General Appropriation Act of 1951, Sec. 1214, reduced the 
funds appropriated for the ECA by $50 million, making the appropriation for fiscal 1951 $2,200 million.  
c. The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 authorized the ECA to issue notes for purchase by the Secretary 
of the Treasury not exceeding $1 billion for the purpose of allocating funds to the Export-Import Bank for 
the extension of loans, but of this amount, $27.7 million was reserved for investment guaranties. The For-
eign Aid Appropriation Act of 1950 increased the amount of notes authorized to be issued for this purpose 
by $150 million. The General Appropriation Act of 1951 authorized the Administrator to issue notes up to 
$62.5 million for loans to Spain, bringing the authorized borrowing power for loans to $1,184.8 million. 
d. The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 was amended in April 1949 to provide additional borrowing au-
thority of $122.7 million for guaranties. The Economic Cooperation Act of 1950 increased this authority 
by $50 million, making the total $200 million for investment guaranties. 
e. Transfers from other agencies included: from Greek-Turkish Aid funds, $9.8 million; from GARIOA funds 
(Germany), $187.2million; from MDAP funds, $254.9 million. The Foreign Aid Appropriation Act of 
1950 and the General Appropriation Act of 1951 authorized the President to transfer the functions and 
funds of GARIOA to other agencies and departments. Twelve million dollars was transferred to ECA from 
GARIOA under Section 5(a) of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1950 and the remainder under the Presi-
dent's authority. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 appropriated funds to the President, who was 
authorized to exercise his powers through any agency or officer of the United States. Transfers to ECA 
were made by Executive Order. 
f. Transfers to other agencies included: $50 million to the Yugoslav relief program, $75.4 million to the Far 
Eastern program, and $100 million to India. The transfer to Yugoslavia was directed by the Yugoslav Emer-
gency Relief Assistance Act of December 29, 1950. The transfer to the Far Eastern program was made by 
presidential order (presidential letters of March 23,April 13, May 29, and June 14, 1951). The transfer to 
India was made by presidential order (presidential letter of June 15,1951). 
Source: Brown, Jr., and Opie, 1953, p. 247 (from CRS Report for Congress, U.S. Information Agency Home-
page). 
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True, there is much debate on whether the ensuing post-war ”economic miracle” in Europe can 
be ascribed to the Plan and its off-springs (like the EPU) even partially, because—as the skep-
tics argue—the resources transferred constituted only less than 3 per cent of combined national 
incomes of OEEC–countries, because they were less than one fifth of gross investment, and be-
cause only 17 per cent of Marshall aid was spent on machinery and vehicles at home, the re-
maining part on commodity imports from the United States.4 But the skeptics must also explain 
why Europe could maintain an investment level of about 20 per cent of GDP during that time—
one third higher than before the war—despite the fact that national savings had actually been 
zero in 1948. There is evidence that countries that received more aid under the Plan also in-
vested more (De Long and Eichengreen 1991). Moreover, the Marshall Plan had a high lever-
age effect through the mobilization of counterpart funds in national currencies because national 
governments had to match Marshall aid through their own taxpayers’ money in order to account 
for program costs denominated in local currency. Also, the impact of the Program was en-
hanced through the possibility to target the funds on specific areas for reconstruction and devel-
opment. And the yields on new investment were indeed extremely high the social rate return on 
investment being estimated as high as 50 per cent a year during that period.5 
The main beneficiaries of the Plan were the United Kingdom (24 per cent) and France (20 per 
cent of total aid). The losers of the War, (West) Germany and Italy, received essentially half of 
these amounts with only 10 and 11 per cent of the total). In terms of per-capita transfers, the 
main beneficiaries were Iceland, the Netherlands, Austria, Greece and Norway—all smaller 
European countries. Among the bigger countries with populations exceeding 40 million, again 
the United Kingdom and France were at the top in terms of per-capita transfers received—with 
both securing approximately US $ 420 each in today’s prices. By contrast, West Germany and 
Italy received only about $210 and $190 per capita in 1997 US dollars (Table 2). 
If per-capita transfers received by country are related to the per-capita average of the region 
(excluding the population figure for the Asian part of Turkey), the relativities can be seen from 
the Chart. Four groups can be distinguished. Portugal, Turkey and Sweden form a group with 
less than 30 per cent of aid in per capita terms; West Germany and Italy received 40 per cent, 
and a third less than the average in per capita terms. Belgium/Luxembourg, Denmark, the United 
Kingdom and France each obtained roughly 30 per cent more than the average per-capita. The 
smaller countries Norway, Greece, Austria and the Netherlands clearly stand out in terms of 
per-capita aid received, the latter three countries obtaining about twice as much as the average. 
There is only one country that comes close to the average per capita amount—Ireland. The wide 
dispersion of per capita aid is with a standard deviation of 66.7 percent is indeed striking. 
                                                 
4  De Long and Eichengreen (1991), p. 30. It should be noted however that such imports 
were not exclusively for consumption and that these commodities also set world quality stan-
dards for the emerging European production, a precondition for successful exports during the 
following years. 
5  Ibidem. 
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Table 2: European Recovery Program Recipients 
April 3, 1948, to June 30, 1952 
(Millions of dollars) 
 Population Current dollars Constant 1997 dollars Share of 
 in 1000 Total Per capita Total Per capita total in percent 
Austria 6,934 (June 1952) 677.8 97.75 4,486.9 647.09 5.1  
Belgium/  
Luxembourg 
9,025 (Mid-1952) 559.3 61.97 3,702.5 410.25 4.2  
Denmark 4,336 (mid-1951) 273.0 62.96 1,807.2 416.79 2.0  
France 42,500 (March 1952) 2,713.6 63.85 17,963.6 422.67 20.4  
Greece 7,600 (April 1951) 706.7 92.99 4678.2 615.55 5.3  
Iceland 145 (Mid-1951) 29.4 202.72 194.0 1,337.93 0.2  
Ireland 2,959 (Mid-1951) 147.5 49.85 976.4 329.98 1.1  
Italy 46,885 (September 1952) 1,508.8 32.18 9,988.0 213.03 11.3  
Netherlands 10,377 (July 1952) 1,083.5 104.41 7,172.6 691.20 8.1  
Norway 3,308 (March 1952) 255.3 77.18 1,690.0 510.88 1.9  
Portugal 8,606 (Mid-1951) 51.2 5.95 338.9 39.38 0.4  
Sweden 7,126 (June 1952) 107.3 15.06 710.3 99.68 0.8  
Turkey 23,485 (December 1950) 
(a) 
225.1 9.58 1,490.1 63.45 1.7  
United  
Kingdom 
50,650 (December 1951) 3,189.8 62.98 21,115.9 416.90 23.9  
West Germany 48,708 (December 1952) 1,390.6 28.55 9,205.5 188.99 10.4  
Regional - - 407.0 2,694.3  3.1  
Total  13,325.9 48.87 88,214.4 323.55 100.0  
a. European part only. 
Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, November 16, 1997 (from CRS Report for Congress, 
U.S. Information Agency Homepage). Population data from Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (various issues); own calculations. 
 
 
There is wide agreement that the Plan alone would probably not have achieved much and that it 
was but one of several factors that added to economic growth and reconstruction in Europe. Ex-
isting human resources, sound infrastructure—albeit badly damaged—, regained access to new 
technologies and world markets, a robust legal framework and functioning bureaucracies as 
well as widespread political support in the region equally contributed to this ”miracle”. But 
although the direct effects of the Plan on growth in Europe may be questioned, a number of dis-
tinctive elements of the program were indeed important for post-war economic and political 
developments and the enhancement of well-being in Western Europe: 
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Chart: European Recovery Program Recipients 
Per capita transfers received in percent of average per capita aid 
 
 
Source: See Table 2. 
 
• First, it was the explicit recognition of a positive relationship between economic and po-
litical stability. This does not only emphasize the role of sound economic conditions for 
consolidating the role of government and the political system. It also embraces a dynamic 
component for attaining long-run stability and sustainability of European economies, be-
cause most of the aid was given in the form of grants and large amounts of indebtedness of 
the new partners in an emerging transatlantic partnership was thus avoided. The lessons of 
the Treaty of Versailles and its consequences had been learned. 
• Second, it was the recognition of national sovereignty of OEEC countries—although under 
Allied control in the case of Germany—, and the institutions of the Plan fostered dialogue 
and cooperation, not submission or coercion. Initiatives had to be taken by recipient coun-
tries, implementation was a joint endeavor, and responsibilities were shared. Although the 
United States had a clear-cut foreign policy objective of their own—the containment of 
communism in the world—, the emphasis of the Plan was on partnership and mutual respect. 
Thus the European institutions created under the Plan, the OEEC and EPU, proved to be ex-
tremely effective instruments of U.S. diplomacy under difficult historical circumstances.  
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• Third, the national security objectives of the United States were carried on to Western 
Europe and the groundwork for NATO was laid6 which would ultimately prove to be ex-
tremely effective in preserving peace in the Western Hemisphere. The Plan had extended fi-
nancial assistance even to Central and Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union,7 
although the latter and its allies rejected this as an infringement on their national sovereign-
ties and as jeopardizing the long-term aim of a ”world revolution” and the establishment of 
communism at the global scale. By marrying foreign policy objectives, political stability 
and economic recovery, the Plan was indeed ”creative” in its search for peace, and it is 
noteworthy that Marshall became the only professional soldier ever to be awarded the No-
bel Prize for Peace. 
• Fourth, the OEEC as a forum for mutual consultation and cooperation became the cradle of 
more comprehensive economic policy coordination among industrialized countries in the 
world—with progressive expansion of its membership. Some would draw the line even fur-
ther and relate the Plan to the launching of the Coal and Steel Community in 1952, and even-
tually its longer-term successor—the European Union of today. These far-reaching implica-
tions may seem to be exaggerated for many,8 because such developments were mainly 
driven by Europeans initiatives, but the initial trigger effects of the Plan should indeed not 
be underestimated in this context because it probably tipped the balance in a precarious po-
litical and economic situation where the newly emerging or reconstructing democracies in 
Europe—suspicious and unaccustomed to cooperation and partnership—were in search of a 
new feasible ”modus vivendi” among themselves and with the rest of the world. 
• Fifth, the Plan had a distinct leaning toward the free play of the market and toward the lib-
eralization of international trade even where this seemed to jeopardize short-run American 
interests. Indeed, at the time, U.S. businessmen feared (and experienced) both mounting 
competition from European exporters at home, and the loss of formerly uncontested markets 
abroad. The emphasis on the market and on free trade—although by far not fully realized 
immediately—would create the conditions for a consumer-driven reallocation of resources 
and the enhancement of well being in European countries, and for a rapid conversion of 
their ”war-production-machines” into internationally competitive economies. It also brought 
Western Europeans into the club of prospering countries that adopted a liberal, market-
oriented philosophy, and they would become reliable partners in a reintegrating world 
economy.  
However the Plan was not only important because it contributed to mobilize long-run dy-
namic gains from trade in an integrating world economy (from which both sides of the At-
lantic would benefit); it was also decisive in guiding policy making in Western Europe 
where governments were indeed still predisposed toward interventionism and regulation. 
Without the Plan, the dismantling of wartime allocation controls and the elimination of re-
                                                 
6  Compare U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Aid 
Appropriation Bill for 1950, 1949, p.33. 
7  It may be debated though whether this offer was serious and whether it was not simply a 
strategic gesture whose acceptance by the Soviet Union would have embarrassed the U.S. gov-
ernment—playground for speculation by historians, but vain through the pace of events.  
8  It should be noted however that American politics was favorable to the idea of Euro-
pean integration at the time. For instance, John Foster Dulles told the National Publisher’s As-
sociation in January 1948 that any plan for the future of Germany should be ”in terms of the 
economic unity of Europe”. And further ”A Europe divided into small compartments” could not 
be ”a healthy Europe” (from Hogan 1987, p. 37).  
8 
straints on competition and the free movement of resources are likely to have been slower 
and the transition process much more painful for Europeans.  
• Sixth, at the more technical level, the Plan was creative in setting an unambiguous sunset 
date for support; this made it clear that the Plan was to be temporary ”aid toward self-aid”, 
and not to be relied upon indefinitely. This distinguishes it, for example, from the current 
regional transfer program within unified Germany which may be more massive in scale9, 
but certainly less effective because a policy of gap-filling has raised expectations of con-
tinuing bail-outs, it hinders own initiatives, and it slows down structural adjustment in East-
ern Germany.  
• Moreover, the idea of counterpart funds, whereby each country benefiting from Marshall aid 
was required to set aside a matching amount of its own currency, reinforced the impact of 
the program through a leverage effect, and it gave the United States an important policy 
lever in transmitting her own policy priorities—especially as these priorities changed later 
when an increasing proportion of the funds was being channeled toward defense under the 
peril of the Korean War. The policy regarding the counterpart funds was, however, very 
flexible. Whereas they were typically earmarked to very specific investment projects in 
utilities, transportation and communication facilities, for instance, Great Britain was al-
lowed to channel a substantial part of counterpart funds into retiring debt. In France, the re-
lease of counterpart funds seems to have been made contingent on policies leading to a bal-
anced budget (Auriol 1970, p. 162). 
• From Marshall aid, a special fund was branched off to finance technical assistance and to 
bring to Europe experts from the United States. Although this program was small in terms of 
financial commitments, the effects of such assistance are generally thought to be rather im-
portant, and the program as such is considered to have been a success.   
• And finally, the Plan was a tribute to raising the morale of European citizens and it turned 
widespread pessimism into purposeful actions. It also produced—at least in Germany—
feelings of gratefulness—which was to be augmented during the blockade of Berlin—, and 
it contributed to the reconstitution of their national self-esteem after the devastating and hu-
miliating experience of the Nazi regime. 
All these elements combine into a singular American aid program for ”creative peace” which 
will remain forever be linked to State Secretary Marshall’s name. 
The Quest for a ”New Marshall Plan” 
It has often been argued, with regard to the Third World and—more recently—to transition 
economies, that a new Marshall Plan was needed to assist economic development and recon-
struction in these countries. In order to assess whether a new version of the Plan would work 
under the present conditions prevailing in transition and developing countries, it must first be 
understood why the Plan was successful in the first place and what the conditions for its suc-
cess had been.  
Unquestionably, the ERP seed money fell on extremely fertile grounds in post-war Europe. 
European economies were operating in an institutional setting where private property rights had 
                                                 
9  Net transfers from West to East Germany constituted DM 160 billion in 1995, or 42 per 
cent of the recipient region’s GDP—compared to about only 3 per cent of GDP for the OEEC 
countries during the years of the Marshall plan. For more details on regional transfers within 
Germany after unification see Paul Bernd Spahn and Wolfgang Föttinger (1997), Table 4, p. 
234. 
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essentially been preserved—even under Hitler’s planned economy—, where there was a spirit 
of initiative, response, and entrepreneurship, and where there existed functioning administra-
tions in the public sector. There were solid legal foundations that could be relied upon in order 
to foster and support economic activities. Moreover, American aid could mobilize a high de-
gree of political commitment for the objectives of the plan because such commitments of the 
most recent past had been discredited—not only in Germany, but also in other European coun-
tries where collaboration with the Nazi regime had been noticeable. The emphasis of the Pro-
gram was on productivity—rather than rent seeking—and the efficient use of dollars for interna-
tional trade allowed an economic recovery that quickly became self-sustaining. Ironically, the 
destruction of production capacities during the war often proved to be an advantage for Euro-
pean entrepreneurs because it called for the redesign of production from scratch and because it 
inspired firms to discard old-fashioned production lines and to adopt most modern techniques. 
Moreover, economic restructuring and development were supported by a highly motivated, dis-
ciplined and skilled work force that had but one simple new ideology—economic accomplish-
ment and success—after the hardship and, particularly in Germany, political disillusionment 
that had come with the end of the war. Poverty, social distress and fragile democratic institu-
tions together with the lure of a hitherto unknown, but possibly attractive alternative ideology—
communism—spurred the enthusiasm of those, including the Americans, that waged the battle 
against time in order to prevent Europe from falling prey to yet another historic blunder.  
And finally, the Plan had to fill the void of a newly emerging world economic order where the 
main institutions conceived 1944 in Bretton Woods—the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank, and GATT—were still in their infancy and had barely begun to lay the ground-
work for free trade, effective development policies, and a stable financial system for the 
world—with convertibility of currencies, fixed exchange rates, and freedom of capital move-
ment.  
The historic conditions prevailing in post-war Europe were thus unique and cannot simply be 
compared with the situation that prevails in the developing or transition economies of today. In 
a modern, integrating world economic order that prepares for the next century, the circum-
stances are quite different from those that existed fifty years ago.  
• International cooperation has not only become the prevailing policy paradigm, there is also 
a great number of institutions for effective policy coordination and mutual support at the in-
ternational level, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, the World Trade 
Organization—let alone the United Nations and a host of regional development banks. Many 
of these institutions are in a position to mobilize funds for countries in distress, to support 
economic reconstruction and growth, and to work out development programs in conjunction 
with their member governments. Furthermore, they are committed to creating a stable and 
effective framework for international finance and to facilitating access to world capital 
markets, they monitor the common rules established for international trade, and they sustain 
world commodity markets and multilateral trade based on the principles of non-
discrimination and transparency.  
• For the industrialized world, the OECD constitutes an effective coordination agency, and 
the European Union has matured to an entity that shares responsibilities with the United 
States at an international level.  
• Apart from these coordinating institutions, there is a clear trend toward regional economic 
integration and joint policy making among nation states—not only in the European Union, 
but also in other parts of the world (NAFTA, ASEAN, APEC, Mercosur). This implies a 
tendency toward multilateralism rather than bilateralism in addressing economic restructur-
ing and development of retarded regions. 
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• Since the war, the world economy has become highly interdependent. Markets—in particu-
lar financial markets—are increasingly transgressing national boundaries while becoming 
more and more globalized and difficult to regulate or control. The scope for national eco-
nomic policies is not only reduced by regional integration and international policy coordi-
nation, but also by the force of markets and competition at the world level. The free flow 
between countries of factors of production—capital and labor—has created a highly com-
petitive environment with a multitude of new financial instruments and a massive expansion 
of financial activities. Moreover, global competition puts pressure on standardized labor 
contracts with severe consequences for the financing of the welfare state, which is pre-
dominantly based on payrolls, and it impinges on the ability of national governments to tax 
(Tanzi 1995).  
• After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the market paradigm has gained distinction over interven-
tionist philosophies, and the protectionist mood in many transition and developing countries 
has surrendered to more competitive attitudes worldwide. The defensive strategy of import-
substitution in foreign trade—that had retarded economic developments in many parts of the 
world—has finally yielded to a more aggressive export-orientation which benefits both, in-
dustrialized nations and developing countries alike—as the latter open up their economies 
to confront international competition. There are thus first traces of an all-embracing global 
consensus on the importance of market forces and of competition in the efficient use of re-
sources—despite continuing cleavages on the question how to distribute the wealth of na-
tions. 
• The globalization of markets, the decentralization and diversification of production proc-
esses, the ubiquity and ready availability of information, ease of communication, and inter-
national competition, do not only imply the convergence of prices, but also of policies, per-
ceptions, expectations, and visions. In particular, globalization is about to open up the ser-
vice industry, which offers to developing countries an easier access to information, tech-
nology, and markets.  
These new trends in the world economy have greatly enhanced the prospects for economic de-
velopment in transition and emerging economies in conjunction with its financing. In 1996, lib-
eralized private capital markets have mobilized five times as much international capital for the 
developing world than official government aid put together. But private capital flows are also 
more volatile than politically determined aid because they are highly sensitive to perceived 
market risks and to policy blunder. Therefore, private capital in developing, emerging and tran-
sition economies often matures fast, such flows can be rather volatile, and—importantly—they 
dodge are great number countries where growth potentials are sensed to be weaker. Neverthe-
less, they also bear testimony of the fact that finance does not seem to constitute a major bottle-
neck in these days. Moreover, even countries whose access to private capital markets is more 
difficult are not left apart. They can rely on multilateral international lending agencies and on a 
comprehensive network of bilateral arrangements with a great number of investment and devel-
opment banks, as well as on continuing aid from industrialized nations.  
All this renders a new financial aid program similar to the Marshall Plan less compelling now 
than in the post-war period. Furthermore—as demonstrated by Germany’s regional transfer 
program to the Eastern Länder—financial aid can be counterproductive when it is given on a 
continuing basis. It tends to neutralize pressures for economic restructuring, it raises expecta-
tions for further bailouts, and ”financial dependency” may easily become a ”life-style”—even 
for nations. So it should be clear that a new Marshall Plan for transition and developing coun-
tries cannot be, and should not be, a long-term restructuring exercise, a point that is frequently 
overlooked by those that advocate for a new Plan. 
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It is therefore important to stress that the Marshall Plan was succinctly limited in time and this 
was an important element of its success. The question is now whether a targeted, time-limited 
ERP for Central and Eastern Europe could have made sense after the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
This question is more rhetoric than real, because historically such a program was not brought to 
bear, and by now its chances appear to have been missed. Hence, were today’s politicians less 
visionary than State Secretary Marshall at his time? 
Perhaps, some would say, but I plead that even Marshall may have hesitated to propose his 
program for transition countries in the historically unique situation after the collapse of commu-
nism. Why? As argued above, countries can nowadays rely on a well-functioning international 
capital market, and there are international bodies that specialize in the setting-up of economic 
development and restructuring schemes, and they combine it with specific, targeted and condi-
tioned financial aid—not only the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, but also the 
United States and the European Union as well as specific European agencies such as the Lon-
don-based European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). And there are many 
reasons to believe that it was wise to put those institutions in charge of dealing with the im-
mense challenge after the historical break-down of communism rather than going for a blind re-
make of the Marshall Plan of fifty years ago. The channeling of unconditional finance into the 
formerly communist countries would have indeed been dubious 
• because their political and administrative institutions, the organization of production and 
distribution, and the legal framework for economic operations were (and still are, to some 
extent) inappropriate for a well-functioning market economy; 
• because key economic sectors, such as finance and other highly specialized services, were 
deficient in these countries and typically had to be re-built from scratch; 
• because private property had been limited, and collective property rights had thwarted in-
vestment initiatives and entrepreneurship; moreover, reforms to rewind this process had to 
be slow by nature, and they tended to be erratic; 
• because entrepreneurship and specific skills of a modern service industry were (and still 
are) largely absent; 
• because public enterprises were non-competitive in these formerly-closed economies, with 
poor technologies in most industries, hidden subsidies at all levels of production, and ex-
cessive social functions bestowed upon the enterprise sector;  
• because administered pricing had eliminated or distorted economic incentives; this was 
also true for post-war Western Europe, but the length of time socialist countries had en-
dured such regime as well as its proportions were more biting, and a harsh reversal of the 
policy threatened to entail social hardship and was therefore limited in scale; and finally 
• because the level of public expenditures was unsustainable, and the tax system was distor-
tive and misconstrued. 
Consequently, a first period of restructuring had to be devoted to the establishment of a political 
and legal framework to support civil liberties and the play of a free market—liberalization and 
privatization—, to institutional reforms to sustain, inter alia, capital markets and other non-
bank financial sectors, and to the restoring of macroeconomic stability. True, grantor govern-
ments and international donors have tried to encourage such restructuring through conditional 
grants and loans, but such transfers could hardly become as effectual as the Marshall Plan as 
long as these requirements had not been met. The first-round transfers to transition economies 
can thus be regarded as a vehicle to encourage basic reforms, which was typically expected to 
bear fruit only in the long run—different from the American approach of fifty years ago.  
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In a second phase of reform in transition economies the key challenges will be ”to build, con-
solidate and strengthen the institutions, policies and practices which underpin a well-
functioning market economy and the investment that supports growth. In responding to these 
challenges, good governance will be crucial. This must involve openness, transparency and 
credibility and the absence of bureaucratic interference and corruption. Such governance is vi-
tal to the emergence and maintenance of an effective competitive process. The private sector 
must also in this phase build the sound business practices, which will lead to long-term suc-
cess. Good governance both encourages and is supported by the development of civil society.” 
(EBRD 1997).  
Again, this is a longer-lasting and painful process that cannot be expected to bear fruit rap-
idly—neither with, nor without grant money—, because the necessary reforms generally lag be-
hind, and progress in enterprise restructuring and improving governance continues to be slow in 
many transition economies. Furthermore, it is exacerbated by severe income inequality, fragile 
institutions and uncertainty about legal rights and entitlements, the lack of understanding the 
rules of a market economy, weak initiatives in the private domain, and poor performance of the 
public sector—with corruption in the public administration.  
Was the Marshall Plan then a historic incident with no further relevance for solving today’s 
problems? Nothing could be more mistaken! In today’s search for ‘creative peace’, one can still 
benefit from Marshall’s basic philosophy, from the cooperative and multilateral spirit of his 
program, from his idea of partnership, shared responsibilities, collaboration among govern-
ments and institutions, mutual respect and full recognition of sovereignty and individual free-
dom. Such virtues are crucial in a globalizing world where information, attitudes, and moral 
values will have to be shared without spurring new ideological cleavages and combats. We 
still have to be ‘creative’ in the search for peace—as Marshall was at his time—although dif-
ferent conditions will commend different measures. But his basic message—cooperation, con-
certation, dialogue and respectful deliberation—rests all the same.  
”Creative Peace” Today  
As follows from the preceding analysis, the conditions for financing reconstruction and devel-
opment are very different from those that existed after World War II. There is now mounting 
agreement on a ”world economic order” which is favorable to market processes and critical to 
state interventionism. Moreover, there are functioning international institutions such as the In-
ternational Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and there are private capital markets that are 
prepared to bring savings to work on a global scale—even to the lesser-developed countries 
provided that their sovereign risks are manageable. So finance does not seem the main bottle-
neck in these days and financial aid as such will not be sufficient to solve the pending prob-
lems. What is required to allow the formerly socialist and the developing countries to partici-
pate in global welfare and its expansion can be typified by three i’s: institution-building, infra-
structure, and integration. 
Institution-building 
Institution-building means democratization of the society in order to have citizens participate in 
public-decision making and to set up the necessary control mechanisms for checking errand be-
havior such as collusion and corruption; it also means the establishment of a robust financial 
sector with an independent Central Bank and the conduct of a stability-oriented monetary pol-
icy, as well as a healthy private banking sector that is subject to international competition and 
functions in a transparent way; and there is need for tax reform, for the improvement of the 
budget process and the realization of fiscal discipline through hard budget constraints. Institu-
tion-building implies fiscal decentralization and the enhancement of allocating public re-
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sources; it entails a clear definition of property rights, including risks associated with the envi-
ronment; it requires the overhaul of existing pension systems and the confinement of other finan-
cial risks of the public sector, the detachment of the government budget from public enterprises 
(privatization—in particular of state banks which provide access to soft financing); the 
strengthening of the domestic private financial sector and its control; it means the corroboration 
of the political and legal system and its institutions, as well as the improvement of the overall 
climate for investment and economic activities. Soft financing through foreign aid would proba-
bly only slow down this adjustment process—unless clearly based on a code of conditionality.  
As for institution building in transition and developing countries, responsibility must remain 
with the citizens of these countries and their respective representatives in the first place. Assis-
tance from abroad will always find its limits in a given national polity and the perceptions of 
the citizens and agents living therein. Foreign assistance has thus to be confined to technical ad-
vice—which may be supported by financial incentives. Today such expertise as well as corre-
sponding funding mechanisms are predominantly vested in functioning international organiza-
tions—although bilateral aid may complement the complex mosaic of international political and 
economic relations.  
In this context, the International Monetary Fund must continue to assume a key role in coordinat-
ing macroeconomic policies and in developing and implementing monetary and fiscal reforms. 
In the past, the IMF has often assisted structural transformation processes, notably in the former 
Soviet Union, and therefore some observers—including the Bretton-Woods Commission—
advocate for a stricter separation of functions from those of the World Bank. The latter should 
primarily focus on microeconomic restructuring, while the International Monetary Fund should 
fulfill its tasks in the area of macroeconomic policy coordination. However, this separation is 
difficult given the fact that structural policies, institutional and political reform, and develop-
ment processes are intrinsically connected to macroeconomic adjustment.  
In order to assist institution building within emerging countries and to support private-sector 
capital flows in this part of the world, the IMF must concentrate on its role as a crisis manager 
in anticipation. This requires stronger surveillance through continuous and more candid dia-
logues with member countries and the closer monitoring of data. ”The world community would 
gain by using the Fund as the principal forum for multilateral surveillance and coordination of 
national fiscal and monetary policies” (Singh 1995, p. 38). The Fund must develop a set of 
standards to guide member governments in publishing economic and financial data on their own 
and to keep markets better informed. This is to provide the discipline needed to ensure a sys-
tematic review of economic developments; it provides an opportunity for governments to de-
liver collective advice; and it permits markets to make informed decisions and perform its role 
more efficiently. Also financial market supervision and regulation would have to be strength-
ened both at the national and the international level.  
Infrastructure 
As to infrastructure development, the World Bank performs a key rule in assisting structural 
adjustments to render markets more responsive to change and to enhance economic welfare. In 
recent times, this has been particularly important in the context of transforming the formerly so-
cialist economies. Continuing widespread poverty in many countries, population growth and 
pressing environmental problems all pose major development challenges. Thus, the case for a 
major role for the World Bank is strong and even more acute. Together with regional develop-
ment banks, it plays a key part in promoting sustainable social and economic development. 
However, the Bank will have to narrow its focus on cofinancing public goods for which private 
resources are difficult to mobilize. This is not at odds with the present philosophy of the Bank, 
which tends to foster private sector developments and to mobilize resources for poverty reduc-
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tion through markets. The end of the Cold War will permit the World Bank to avoid misalloca-
tion of resources through political concessions, and to insist, instead, on harsher conditionality 
and to concentrate on projects with a high social rate of return. The Bank is now in a better po-
sition to decline lending to governments that lack commitment in reducing poverty, that violate 
human rights or misallocate resources for military oppression and corruption. The Bank will 
have to place the emphasis on supporting primary education and health, and on the protection of 
the environment. Moreover, the Bank must assume a key role in coordinating international de-
velopment projects among major donor countries and multilateral institutions. And the Bank 
should decentralize its operations wherever possible without losing the coherent framework of 
its general policy out of sight. This will enhance its effectiveness and foster democratic partici-
pation. 
The global trend in the world economy also requires the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund to catalyze greater private sector involvement. This means, inter alia, that the 
work of the IFC and MIGA has to be integrated more strongly in their programs. Non-
government institutions and new public-private arrangements will offer new chances to realize 
development projects with greater participation of beneficiaries and the private sector while 
assuring adequate risk-sharing between public and private lenders. A change in the Statutes of 
the Bank may also have to be considered which now restrict operations to those whose sover-
eign risks are fully guaranteed. In a world in which some countries have emerged from under-
development, others are freed from the yoke of totalitarianism, it seems to be perverse that the 
Bank has to refrain from business with these potentially more dynamic regions whenever these 
that ask for some risk-sharing, while it would have to concentrate on the poorer, albeit riskier, 
countries which assume a full bail-out guarantee of little value. 
However, there will be a continuing need for poverty alleviation in a globalizing world. The 
main instrument for this purpose is the enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF) of the 
International Monetary Fund that provides conditioned assistance for growth-oriented adjust-
ment programs in low-income countries. This facility was recently extended and enlarged, and 
a self-sustaining facility will be put in place. This constitutes a decisive improvement in the 
plight of poor countries. It is an irony, however, that the financing of IDA as the suborganization 
with the heaviest impact on alleviating poverty is constantly at risk and that major contributors, 
like the United States, fail to honor their commitments. Official development assistance of in-
dustrialized countries, multilateral and bilateral, is now less than 0.3 percent of GDP, at the 
lowest level since 1973, a trend that should be reversed. 
Increasing demands on the Bretton Woods institutions resources will also require a strengthen-
ing of the financial basis for multilateral action in a globalizing world. While there are initia-
tives to develop new parallel financing arrangements by the Group of Ten and selected other 
countries with the aim of doubling the credit lines available under the General Agreement to 
Borrow (GAB) of the Fund, this measure is likely to be insufficient and not a substitute for an 
increase in quota. The fiftieth Annual Meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank of October 1995 has endorsed an emergency financing mechanism in order to enable the 
IMF to respond rapidly—with sizable front-loaded financing—to deal with potential Mexico-
style crises. It also supported currency stabilization funds on a short-term basis for confidence 
building, and to expand the scope of emergency assistance in post-conflict situations. In 1997 
the IMF quota have been increased again, but in view of the more recent turbulence in South-
East-Asian financial markets, it is doubtful whether the scope for emergency funding is suffi-
ciently large. In particular short-term events such as those observed in foreign currency and 
other asset markets that require temporary multilateral interventions that may put longer-term 
infrastructure developments in other parts of the world at risk. 
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Integration 
While institution-building and infrastructure development is mainly a responsibility of govern-
ments of transition and developing nations themselves, where foreign assistance can only be 
subsidiary, integration requires active participation of Western nations as well as the political 
will to cooperate with formerly socialist and developing countries. It is there where Marshall’s 
spirit of partnership and mutual respect, of cooperation and concertation is imperative. Political 
and economic integration is the paramount device in the search for ‘creative peace’ under mod-
ern conditions. It offers a platform for solving international conflicts through deliberation and 
negotiation, and it has to potential to enhance welfare through the arbitration of opportunities 
that are mutually beneficial to consumers and producers. It also leads to the forming of a net-
work of political, cultural, commercial and personal relations that will ultimately conduct to a 
better understanding among individuals and agencies, and thus consolidate peace.  
At the political level, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, NATO’s ‘Part-
nership for Peace’, the Group of Eight, the Council of Europe, and many other multilateral bod-
ies and institutions now take a cooperative approach to a wide range of issues—which they try 
to achieve through preventive diplomacy, confidence and security building measures, arms con-
trol, economic policy concertation, the exchange of information and technical assistance, de-
mocratic and economic institution-building, election monitoring, and so forth. The extension of 
NATO is an important approach to political integration of the formerly socialist world, which 
can only be successful if combined with confidence and security building. 
At the economic level, the expansion of trade with transition and developing countries is man-
datory in order to help them overcome their balance-of-payment problems and to foster their re-
insertion into the world economy. This requires, inter alia, a revision of the hitherto protection-
ist attitudes in some sectors of the economy such as agriculture where the comparative advan-
tages are clearly on the side of countries like Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Third World. 
A new round of WTO-negotiations will have to settle such problems, but this could be too slow 
a process for integrating Central and Eastern European countries into the world economy rap-
idly enough, and some immediate political action is required. The European Union and its agri-
cultural policy play a key role in this context. Although there are first indications of a change in 
attitudes, much remains to be accomplished. Official statements such as ”The World Trade Or-
ganization’s rules, and the prospect of international WTO negotiations in 1999, mean that the 
Union must be in a position to defend its interests from a position of strength”10 do not augur 
well in this respect. 
Fostering trade with Central and Eastern European countries is just one element of a new type 
of creative peace policy. The decisive step will, of course, have to be the enlargement of the 
European Union and the acceptance of full membership, mutual respect and full recognition of 
sovereignty and individual freedom among nations in this part of the world. As in the days of 
Marshall, shared responsibilities and collaboration among governments and institutions are the 
ultimate test for partnership in a Europe that has finally come to overthrow the legacies of 
communism and of World War II.  
Conclusions 
The Marshall Plan was a success at its time and it had significant portent beyond its immediate 
financial impact—which may be questioned. The Plan stressed the positive relationship be-
tween economic and political stability; it emphasized the free play of the market and the liber-
                                                 
10  See ” The Commission’s Work Programme for 1998: The political priorities”, in 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/opoce/indexfr.htm (December 1997). 
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alization of international trade; it fostered dialogue and cooperation; it married foreign policy 
objectives, political stability and economic recovery; it created a forum for mutual consultation 
and cooperation among industrialized countries; and it raised the morale of European citizens 
turning wide-spread pessimism into purposeful actions. These are its main outcomes that go 
well beyond finance. 
In the light of such historical experience, the quest for a new Marshall Plan directed toward the 
formerly socialist and developing countries is understandable, but it neglects the fact that the 
world economy has dramatically changed during the last half of a century. Moreover, the spe-
cific conditions that initially prevailed in transition countries would have made such a program 
rather dubious. Unconditional funds to Central and Eastern European countries would have 
evaporated without notable results because political and administrative institutions were and 
are weak, the organization of production and distribution is inadequate, and the legal frame-
work for economic operations is fragile. The lack, in these countries, of an institutional frame-
work to support market forces and initiatives is likely to have rendered financial aid ineffec-
tive. Also good governance is needed (and often lacking) for a successful transition process. 
Good governance must involve openness, transparency and credibility as well as the absence of 
bureaucratic interference and corruption. 
The most important prerequisites for successful transformation and development are institution 
building, infrastructure, and integration. Institution building implies the democratization of soci-
ety in order to have citizens participate in public-decision making and to set up necessary con-
trol mechanisms. Infrastructure development is needed to assist structural adjustment, to render 
markets more responsive to change, and to enhance economic welfare. Political and economic 
integration of transition and developing countries is the paramount device in the search for 
‘creative peace’ under modern conditions. 
While institution-building and infrastructure development is mainly the responsibility of gov-
ernments of transition and developing nations themselves, integration requires active participa-
tion of Western nations as well as the political will to cooperate with formerly socialist and 
developing countries. It is there where Marshall’s spirit of partnership and mutual respect, of 
cooperation and concertation is still meaningful. Marshall’s legacy is his vision, not so much a 
program that was appropriate for post-war Europe. ‘Creative peace’ today exacts politicians to 
draw on Marshall’s imagination and to design new programs in his spirit if they want to pass 
the test of history—as Marshall did indeed. 
Let me conclude with the words of President Bill Clinton in The Hague earlier this year: 
”Now, the dawn of new democracies is lighting the way to a new Europe in a 
new century—a time in which America and Europe must complete the noble 
journey that Marshall’s generation began, and this time with no one left behind.” 
(President Bill Clinton, at a commemorative event for the 50th anniversary of the 
Marshall Plan, in the Hall of Knights, Binnenhof, The Hague, Netherlands, May 
28, 1997.) 
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